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Introduction: Rethinking
the Political Economy
of Post-Socialism

By the end of 1991, the West's significant other was replaced by fifteen
independent countries undergoing experiments of remaking complex
social structures, what one group of scholars called a "quadruple transition" (D'Anieri, Kravchuk, and Kuzio 1999): transforming economies
(marketization), polities (democratization), state structures, and political
identities and communities (nations and ethnicities). This event, whose
echoes reverberate, is among the most important events for the social
sciences, as these experiences provide social laboratories to study theories of economics and politics (unfortunately for those enduring the
experiments). Yet social science failed to address adequately the massively complex process unfolding there. On the economic front, early
predictions, hopes, and analyses growing out of the neoliberal model
(Lipton et al 1990; Lipton, Sachs, and Summers 1990; Fisher and Gelb
1991; Aslund 1995) could not adequately account for confusion, conflict, and multiple trajectories in their overly simplistic and normative
accounts of economic and political life. Actors themselves, from political elite and nomenklatura to steelworkers and students, understood little
more than academics: while not wedded to problematic formal theories, their common sense told them some kinds of change were needed,
such as releasing the polity and economy from the grip of the state
and hegemonic Communist Party. On the political front, the consolidation of democracy has been far from uniform and smooth across
post-socialist countries, and several have taken steps "backward" into
various forms of authoritarianism, whether covert (Ukraine and Russia)
or overt (Belarus). State structures remain sturdier in East Europe than
in the former USSR, as corruption and state capacity to enforce policies
have haunted the latter for twenty years or more. National and ethnic
boundaries and identities remain explosive, leading to disintegration
1
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(Yugoslavia) and internal conflict (Russia) as well as tensions that are
less explosive but still troubling (e.g. Ukraine).
While the label "post-socialist" is used less often in academic and
public discourse, this does not mean we should discard the label of
the meaning behind it. The socialist experience and the process and
dynamics by which Soviet-style socialism fell-along with the countries,
politics, economies, and societies involved-remain important issues.
Dynamics of social, political, and economic change after 1991 deserve
yet more study, but scholarship has continuously been dogged by obstacles and problems: access to necessary data, language barriers, trying to
make sense of a moving target (when scholarly production is a drawnout process), and the intersection of scholarly debates with political
agendas. I would add another: meta-theoretical narratives themselves,
with their categories and narratives of social normality, clouded scholarly judgment. Scholars were not sufficiently reflexive about their own
categories of analysis. Consider the fate of the category "post-socialism"
(not the phenomenon). Without the "post-socialist" category, there
would not be "post-socialist" research. As of late, the vague label "emerging markets" seems a favored term that lumps post-socialist countries
with others of different historical backgrounds and trajectories, driving
potential attention away from the socialist experiment and experience. Yet the assignment of this category across the board assumes an
ambiguous "one-size-fits-all" "market" is "emerging" inexorably in these
post-socialist countries. This fits the universalizing logic of economic
theory: all contexts of time and space lose their specific meanings and
significance. 1 All of social time and space become one generic whole, less
from any particular insights than from the attempt to fit human empirical reality into a theory and method that cannot account for meaning,
power, and other social factors that are contextually dependent. This
hides issues of complex mechanisms of social, political, and economic
change, and denies fundamental variation in processes and trajectories.
(Or if there is variation, it must be marginal-else we would not have
"emerging" and "markets" together.) This clumps Russia (and Ukraine,
Belarus, etc.) with other "emerging markets"-yet this makes sense only
if we presume history, culture, and "path dependence" do not matter. 2
While the majority of economists and political scientists in the rational
choice tradition might assume thus, empirical studies on many fronts
show that path dependency remains powerful and that history matters
through preexisting practices, stocks of knowledge, and assumptions of
social normality and legitimate social organization. To make sense of
how the Soviet Union as a complex of ideology, institutions, practices,
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organizations, and structures shifted and was remade, we have to take
seriously the past as well as contingent processes of social construction.
This means moving beyond the instrumental rationality that dominates much of the social sciences, especially economics but also political
science and some sociology. Instrumental rationality denotes a way of
thinking primarily in terms of means to reach goals most effectively
and efficiently; goals are generally taken as given. Actors calculate costs
and benefits of action for achieving those ends, and they view their
social world in terms of tools to use toward those ends. Tools, costs
and benefits, and ends are generally materialist: money, time, or other
"real" objects that can be measured, or whose worth (utility) can be measured. In the rational actor model that dominates economic theory and
increasingly political science, the typical individual is not far from being
a lawyer or accountant (only without special training). 3 Certainly, there
are moments when we calculate costs and benefits of action, pursue
materialist goals, and think of rules, other people, and the like as instrumental tools. My goal is not to deny instrumental rationality exists.
Yet to ground analyses entirely or primarily in instrumental rationality
severely oversimplifies social life. Norms, meanings, assumptions of how
the social world operates normally, 4 and the like-what social scientists
lump under "culture"-are important in everyday social, political, and
economic life. We might calculate-although the degree to which we
do so clearly and consciously, even "rationally," remains debatable-but
calculations are embedded in our assumptions and understandings of
what we should and can calculate, how we measure and embody value,
and categories by which we code other actors and actions around us.
Actors don't merely respond unconsciously to "incentives"; they turn
to "tool kits" of norms, strategies, and symbols (Swidler 1986) to make
sense of and to respond to contexts.
To use the language of economic sociology, not enough scholarship of the post-socialist experience has placed sufficient emphasis on
embeddedness (Granovetter 1985). Those studies that have attempted to
do so, for example invoking networks or aspects of culture (Humphrey
2002; McDermott 2002), provide good first steps forward, except that
embeddedness in too many cases is not sufficiently systematic or is conceived of in only one dimension, such as networks, political alliances,
or legal frameworks. It is also as if networks or culture is added on top of
the analysis, rather than providing core ideas guiding the analysis. This
book makes embeddedness central and seeks to explore the social roots
and nature of the politics of post-Soviet, post-socialist change-to open
up those tool kits of norms and responses. Most work by economists
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and political scientists has provided important insights and grist for
debate (albeit not always the best policies). However, much of that
discourse suffers from flaws that narrow their analytic vision and contribute to errors of omission and commission. In particular, these works
tend to assume instrumental rationality as the sole or predominant logic
of human decision-making and action; as a result, these myriad works
tend to focus primarily on technical aspects of change, that is specific
legislation or actors' narrow material interests. Again, I do not claim
material interests, instrumental rationality, and technical details of policies are unimportant-but they are only part of the picture. To fixate on
them without considering broader "culture" and "authority" in which
social action is embedded risks oversimplifying or erroneously identifying roots of action and processes of change. Thus, a key goal is to
use an overview of Russia's post-Soviet history, especially the turbulent
1990s, to examine just how culture and authority mattered in contextualizing instrumental rationality and the operation and outcomes of
reforms. In particular, I examine the confrontation between two logics
of social-economic practice, organization, and legitimacy: market and
moral economies.

Post-Soviet scholarship, theory, and social-economic
normality
When the iron curtain fell in 1989 and the USSR vanished in 1991,
scholarship was already studying political transformations in Latin
America and East Asia, especially the turn from state-led economies
to freer markets and military or single-party dictatorships to more
open polities. Trajectories and processes of economic and political
change depended on relations to the global economy, policy timing and
sequencing, and relations between states and domestic elites (Gereffi
and Wyman 1990; Haggard 1990; Haggard and Kaufman 1992; Evans
1995). It would seem that scholars should have been ready to make sense
of post-socialism. At first glance, Latin American and socialist economies
seemed similar: strong state roles, including property ownership and
price controls; protectionist insulation from the global economy; and
politicization of the economy (Przeworski 1991; Clague 1992). However,
there were important differences between the Soviet economic system
and Latin American Import Substitution Industrialization that would
lead to differences not only in initial conditions but also in the learning
and reform processes (Beltran and Hass 2010). Twenty years later it is
apparent how the depth of difficulties in post-socialist reforms was not

Introduction: Rethinking the Political Economy of Post-Socialism 5

so well appreciated or expected in the early 1990s. Latin America had
private property, capitalist elites, and operational relations of exchange
and investment with foreign corporations and institutional investors.
Latin American states intervened in the economy more through price
and wage controls and ownership or subsidization of important, large
firms (e.g. oil, telecommunications, finance). In the Soviet economy,
the economy was embedded in the state; the state was the economy.
Price and employment stability were closely linked to ideological legitimation of regime and system. Civil society existed only in shadows of
the Party-state. Not ready to burst out with liberalization, civil society
instead had to create itself once the Soviet Union and its satellite states
were sufficiently weak. Often overlooked, Latin American and East Asian
transitions did not entail reconfiguration of nation-states. The collapse
of the USSR meant rebuilding not only economic and political institutions but also identities and confronting legacies of practices that were
consciously anti-capitalist and verged on the theocratic.
Post-Soviet change entailed confronting these legacies-a harbinger
of conflict. Reality did not let us down. Yet limitations of popular
paradigms in economics and political science restricted capacity to foresee problems and trajectories that did not conform to hopes of the
early 1990s: conflict over privatization was no surprise, but the confusion inherent in post-socialist change was underestimated, the degree of
economic conflict was not expected, and emergence of Putin's dirigisme
was not a great surprise but required more thorough understanding.
Inflation, macroeconomic instability, turf wars between the center and
regions or competing elites-these are the stuff of neoclassical economics and political science, and we have learned from studies in these
traditions. But post-Soviet reality was much richer. Even if we focus
on one country, as I do here (Russia), the reality includes issues of
power in all its complexity, culture in all its nuances, and contention
driven not only by material interests but also by moral economies and
notions of normal and legitimate politics and economics. When additional countries are added into the comparative mix, the story becomes
even richer.
In the 1980s, Stephen Cohen (1985) launched an important critique
of Soviet studies and the consensus of the "totalitarian school" that
could not contemplate reform emerging within the system. Nearly fifteen years later, Cohen (1999) launched an attack on "transitology. 11
If many of his remarks were unfair to the full discourse (e.g. Cohen
2009), he is correct that we need to rethink that discourse and its
object. I suggest broad waves of scholarship on post-socialist change
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to help us identify what might need more investigation. While waves
are never perfectly demarcated, this should serve as a basic starting
point. The first wave of post-socialist studies, sometimes called "transitology," ended in the later 1990s, when it was clear that post-Soviet
reforms were more painful and complicated than originally envisioned
(cf. Amsden, Kochanowicz, and Taylor 1994). It was characterized by
optimism for a natural progression to a single market model (regression to a norm), neoclassical assumptions of economics, and a fixation
on prices, exchange, property, and macroeconomic factors (e.g. money
supply).
That first wave of post-socialist scholarship was in part an extrapolation of experiences and "received wisdom" from Latin American
reforms. While the basic assumptions in First Wave's literature were
straightforward and shared by most involved-reliance on the rational actor, simplistic notions about institutions and institutional change,
and simplistic and abstract constructs of an ideal-typical "market"-the
conclusions drawn from these assumptions grouped First Wave scholars into two camps: shock therapists and gradualists. The discourse was
dominated by economists, as in such journals as The Journal ofEconomic
Perspectives (e.g. Ericson 1991; Fisher and Gelb 1991; McKinnon 1991;
Murrell 1991; Svejnar 1991). The First Wave was marked by seminal
statements on the problem of market-building by Lipton et al (1990)
and Lipton, Sachs, and Summers (1990). The major problem of the
Soviet-style economy was price deformation from strong state control
of production and exchange and lack of private property. Given how
neoclassical economic theory relies heavily on prices and equilibrium
to make the model work-prices make the rational actor at the heart
of the model work, equilibrium makes markets "clear" and allows the
assumptions of market efficiency to be fulfilled-this is unsurprising.
Liberalization and privatization were key remedies, although as Clague
(1992) noted, market-building also required institutional change (e.g.
bankruptcy law, defense of property rights, governance law). The shock
therapy school claimed rapid liberalization and privatization were necessary to end the goods famine and create viable market institutions and
infrastructure, while tight budgets and foreign investment would repair
macroeconomic deformations. Initial shock would cause pain, but rational actors maximizing profit in a liberalized environment would quickly
accommodate. Gradualists disagreed, making more of the importance
of learning and making new institutions operative: it was not enough
merely to legislate change, for business actors had to learn and the
state had to enforce the post-socialist market. Scholars in this camp
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(cf. Murrell 1991, 1993) argued that market-building would take longer;
a state sector should be retained while (small) private business became
established and necessary institutions (bankruptcy, property law, courts)
were created, activated, and came over growing pains. After the introduction of limited reforms, actors would be given time to adjust to new
institutions and their logic (Murrell 1991). The drawbacks were obvious
to each side. Shock therapy risked political backlash and might not correspond to social reality (especially the rational actor and equilibrium
assumptions); gradualism risked crashing on the rocks of corruption and
reform backsliding. Shock therapists pointed first to Latin America and
then to Poland as successes (albeit this claim to victory is not without
controversy); gradualists pointed out China (Murrell 1993).
In spite of the debate, both sides had overlapping assumptions.
The first was a single ideal-type "market" toward which Russia and
other post-socialist economies should move. While the contours of this
"market" were never concrete-had they been, variation in capitalist
economies could have been built into models to aid policy-makingthey were also specific in an abstract manner. 5 Markets had liberalized
exchange, private property defended by the state, infrastructure for
information flow (and hence for efficient investment of resources), institutions of entrance (capital markets) and exit (bankruptcy), and in
more sophisticated models governance structures to minimize transaction and agency costs (cf. Clague 1992). This ideal type, no doubt a
holdover from the Cold War era of socialism versus capitalism (rather
than capitalisms), could not allow for adequate inclusion of different forms, such as state-centered oligopolies (France or South Korea),
state/firm cooperative models CTapan), state-sheltered small-firm models (Taiwan), or bank-centered economies (Germany), in addition to
the American model. Given the level of abstraction from reality, the
oversimplified understanding of institutions, and the ahistorical bent of
neoclassical thinking, the focus on a single ideal-typical market is not
surprising, even if this was in the end highly problematic for the First
Wave. Had First Wave scholars incorporated variation, policy choices
would have been more open and would have paid attention to historical, power, and cultural factors. The second assumption of both
camps was that institutions are laws and regulations that shape costs
and benefits; the actor (entrepreneur or firm) was assumed to be a
profit-maximizing rational actor. This is the basic blueprint for New
Institutional Economics (cf. Williamson 1985; North 1990). Certainly
rules matter, and some First Wave scholars are to be commended for
jumping over pure neoclassical theory to take institutions into closer
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account. Yet even so, post-socialist economic reality remained oversimplified, no doubt because even New Institutional Economics remains
oversimplified (cf. North 1990).
By 1996 it was clear that early perspectives could not adequately
answer more sophisticated questions; as a special set of articles in one
issue of American Sociological Review noted (volume 101, issue 1, 1996),
much was misunderstood in East Europe. Arguably the toughest nut
to crack, Russia, was even more badly understood, and extrapolating
from Poland or Hungary to Russia was a dangerous leap of theoretical faith. By the August 1998 financial collapse, the First Wave of
post-socialist scholarship was in tatters, leaving some of its champions (e.g. Anders Aslund) to retreat into apologetics. Michael Burawoy's
(1997) critique of neoclassical approaches hammered home that Russian
post-socialist economic change did not unfold as envisioned by shock
therapists or even gradualists: the landscape was littered with cheap
imports, falling wages, oligarch on the loose, and economic dependency. Further, in comparative context, variation of outcomes could
not be captured adequately with economists' tools. Even early sociological analyses (Burawoy and Hendley 1992; Burawoy and Krotov
1992) suggested that hopes for Russia were at best mixed; some firms
could adapt to rapid changes, while others had a difficult time of it.
What was clear was that muddling through versus adaptability was not
directly correlated with "efficiency," except tautologically. Later studies
(Clarke et al 1994; Blasi, Kroumova, and Kruse 1997; Hass 1999) suggested that variation could be accounted for only by introducing power,
culture, and a deeper understanding of institutions. Russian data (Boeva
and Dolgopiatova 1993; Dolgopiatova 1994; Dolgopiatova and Evseeva
1994; Ryvkina 1998) suggested the transition was anything but-straightforward. Neither shock therapists' nor gradualists' questions, answers,
and models could make sense of where Russia was headed and why.
While there was no single work heralding the Second Wave, several
writings and events make up the initial swell. Arguably, among the
most important was Thomas Graham's (1995) article in Nezavisimaia
gazeta analyzing political "clans." This wave of scholarship, driven by
political science and political economy, appreciated elite intrigue and
the state. If some first wave economic studies proposed reform policies,
second wave literature asked where real policies came from and why
implementation had not created a vibrant market. In particular, the
protracted pain of post-socialist reform and the emergence of oligarchs
bred much second wave scholarship; the repercussions of the August
1998 ruble meltdown and the rise of Vladimir Putin consecrated the
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new wave of scholarship, in which politics reigned supreme. Political stability and authority became central issues in the second wave,
for example weak monitoring and "bank runs" on state resources and
authority (Solnick 1998), problematic financial institutions and policy
tools Oohnson 2000), regional variation stemming from elite coalitions
(Stoner-Weiss 1997), informal privatization of security and violence creating multiple sites of power and thus instability (Volkov 2002), and
competition between the regions and the center over political and
financial sovereignty (Woodruff 1999a), among other issues. The Second Wave of post-socialist studies, especially vis-a-vis Russia, was more
heterogeneous than First Wave literature, which was dominated by
economists and their generally shared paradigm. However, one can find
common threads in the second wave. Because political scientists had
entered the fray, politics and the state had become the main actors to
the various stories. Assumptions of efficiency gave way to assumptions
of competition over power and gain; economies were no longer assumed
to move to equilibrium and a state of efficiency. Instead, the prevailing
theme was that political competition would breed contention and conflict. Most First Wave scholars assumed state leaders were willing and
able to impose some kinds of reforms; Second Wave scholars problematized reform by making politics endogenous. Russia's oligarchs are not
so odd in Second Wave scholarship; in fact, we should have seen them
coming: wasn't this what had happened in Britain (wealthy aristocrats
turning to textiles and trade) and the United States (industrial robber
barons)?
Yet if the Second Wave reminded us of the importance of politics,
both "politics" and "economics" remained trapped in assumptions or
oversimplifications, often related a reliance on instrumental rationality
and rational choice to make theoretical arguments work. "Politics" was
primarily the intrigues and actions of elites, whether in the Kremlin or
regional satraps. Economic structures emerged from elite competition.
There is much to recommend such an approach, and my goal is not
to dismiss political economy out of hand: I learned much from it, as
have many students of social change. Still, the empirical and theoretical
pictures left out much reality. Elites are embedded in webs of meaning,
and their authority is never as automatic as political economy assumes.
In fact, one dilemma of post-socialist elites was creating and maintaining authority over subordinates. One powerful contradiction in much
political economy is that analyses assume states and elites are so central
because their word literally is law enforced by officials and subordinates.
The scholarly image of post-Soviet Russia was a war of sorts between
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generals and colonels (national and regional elites), with everyone else
foot soldiers ready to move at their commanders' orders. Yet in the same
breath, scholars of political economy easily admit the problem of corruption in post-socialist countries. So, institutions assumed to operate
through the actions of subordinate officials, who are often enough corrupt, meaning that laws, policies, and institutions do not operate as they
should. The result is a theoretical dilemma.

Cultural contradictions of post-socialism
In fact, these lacunae are one launching point for this book: rather
than assume institutions and organizations are operative, I claim we
need to examine just how states, economies, authority, and the like
are reproduced or change in everyday practices of "little people." These
practices are more than cold, instrumental calculations that are the basis
of human behavior in economic theory. People have material interests,
but they also have identities and norms: people are usually not onedimensional cold, calculating actors. In addition, market-building also
requires learning a new economic logic and everyday routines as well as
skills (Nelson and Winter 1982), and these cannot be imposed rapidly
by governmental or managerial commands from on high. These dimensions have not gone entirely ignored, and I suggest their importance,
overlooked for most of the 1990s, has helped generate what might be
the beginnings of a third wave, although whether it will swell to a
real "wave" remains to be seen. Caroline Humphrey (2002) was one
such early scholar: her anthropology of post-socialism dug into rituals,
practices, and meanings underlying "corruption," mafiia and organized
crime, consumption, identity, and the real implementation of privatization on the ground. Russian scholars (Boeva, Dolgopiatova, and
Shironin 1992; Ryvkina 1998) noted the importance of culture, power,
and institutions to the Russian case. Herrera (2004) used Bourdieu's concepts of field and habitus to make better sense of regional variation
in economic change, asking just how regional elites and actors took
different paths to change.
These point to "cultural contradictions" in economic change in
Russian post-socialism, which was not only a period of the collapse and
reconstruction of the economic, political, and legal systems, but also the
very meanings making up those systems. While institutional and structural contradictions have been the usual focus on a legion of studies
in economics and political science, the cultural dimension-symbols,
meanings, practices-unfortunately has been badly analyzed, badly
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conceptualized, or even ignored altogether. For example, Shiller, Boycko,
and Korobov (1992) use a cultural model that is a straw man; Soviets,
they claim, wanted enrichment just like Westerners, which they claim
disproves any unique Soviet "culture." However, this use of values-and
an egregiously oversimplistic use and coding of "values"-went beyond
the "straw man" label, as it ignored thirty years of advances in conceptualizing and operationalizing culture. (In average sociology, anthropology, and history, culture means more than simplistic opinion measured
through unsophisticated closed-ended surveys; even political scientists
are moving beyond this outdated conceptualization.) In another example, Solnick (1998) pitted institutional economics against Brzezinski's
(1989) theory of the exhaustion of Soviet ideology to explain the collapse of the USSR. Again, we have a straw man: Brzezinski's "ideology"
is superficial values and norms of the kind easily measurable in opinion surveys but that ultimately says little of importance when analyzing
practice and change. An overreliance on instrumental rationality blinds
us to narratives that actors tell and use to map out strategies and justifications, to themselves as well as constituents and competitors-yet
we ignore these even though they surround us. We literally swim in
a sea of discourse and frames of interpretation; economic theory and
economists are no different. Their frame and narrative is a "science"
that claims "objectivity" in unlocking the Truth of human social behavior. Only by understanding power, culture, and the power-culture link
do mysteries of the transition (e.g. different rates, trajectories, and success of change within the Russian economy) start to make sense (cf. Hass
1999, 2005).
Yet ironically, culture, power, and institutions were never out of view. 6
James Millar (1995) understood their centrality to empirical reality in
his criticisms of neoliberal analyses. Hendley's (1999) empirical account
of inter-enterprise payment structures oozes culture and power, even if
her theory does not. The problem is theoretical. The logic of New Institutional Economics, whereby action is a result of the costs and benefit of
action as set by laws, still holds sway, but doubters have been emerging,
especially from the direction of economic sociology. Mercifully, there
are some quality analyses that apply culture in a sophisticated fashion to
make sense of the confusion and contention that marked post-socialist
transformations (e.g. Humphrey 2002; Kennedy 2002), and this work
builds upon those. This book also draws on insights from the study of
culture and structured meanings in international relations and the outbreak of war (Hopf 2002; Smith 2005), public policy (Dobbin 1994), and
money (Zelizer 1997), among other subjects of political and economic
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sociology. Smith's (2005) study of war is particularly informative. The
decision to go to war is often understood in terms of instrumental
calculations of gain and loss; this is the central point of realism and
neorealism, and it is also the foundation of institutional approaches to
war (much as rational choice underpins New Institutional Economics).
Yet as Smith shows, culture helps predict whether states go to war and
their degree of participation. The key is in a combination of categories
and narratives. Categories of sacred and profane-objects and entities
given meaning and placed into one of the two dichotomies-provide
structure to the social universe. An object is some degree of normal or
abnormal; otherwise, it is an object of ambivalence, off of the discursive
map. These categories are then ordered into logics or narratives of how
they interact and to what their interactions lead.
This reveals a problem of the majority of work on post-socialismironically, their own "cultural" problem. First Wave scholarship took
the market for granted in Western terms, in the process assuming a
single form of "market" economy and translating it into optimistic
but simplistic policy. Economists in particular, but enough political
scientists as well, took their own categories and narratives of "objective prices,'' "markets,'' "efficiency,'' "private property" and the like as
natural for human nature and human social evolution (e.g. private property corresponding to a natural desire of territoriality and ownership,
utility maximization as natural). 7 Russians could be us if their elites
enforced proper policies and everyone obeyed. This made politics of
developing and implementing policy, including the inevitable pain of
adjustment, exogenous-an egregious sin, especially as legitimation of
policies and rationalization of pain were crucial to the narrative but
unspoken. For shock therapists, there would be inevitable early pain
of inflation and unemployment to make up for decades of structural
"deformations" (a normative label already). 8 Surviving early distributional conflicts would be rough waters, but eventually-in theory-the
economy would improve as resources found their proper use and foreign
investment flowed in. As Kennedy (2002) noted, shock therapy was part
of a Western narrative of the triumph of liberalism. The market economy
was the state of nature and progressive; anything else was unnatural and
regressive. Because instrumental rationality was central to shock therapists' paradigms and even identities as economists, it is unsurprising
they could not escape their own narratives to see the importance of
culture. What is somewhat surprising was how some more noted scholars, such as Aslund, Schleifer, and Sachs, continue to beat the neoliberal
drum (I return to this later); what we label "cognitive dissonance" is
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really the difficulty or inability to escape one's categories and narratives
in the face of stronger empirical evidence and counter-arguments.
In the Second Wave, scholars began to take post-socialist economies
on their own terms: as historically and culturally bounded set of practices, structures, and identities, with the process of making these the
focus of study. If the First Wave's mistake was it's a central question of "How will Russia build the market," the Second Wave asked,
"Whose economy is emerging?" and "Who gains?" Yet even then, Second Wave studies undertheorized power, culture, practice, and process.
While political economy made its reappearance as scholars looked at
elite machinations, unexpected outcomes of reforms, and struggles over
power, instrumental rationality and a one-dimensional view of power
once again predominated. Consider seemingly instrumentally rational
phenomena. The return of the shadow economy, tactics of getting into
quick trade and getting out for quick money, hiding from the tax
police-these were "rational" responses to state predation and problematic laws. Russian entrepreneurs did not work long hours to give more
than 100 percent of profit to the state; most would pay all their taxes
and act legally were that not a threat to solvency. First Wave and Second Wave work did rightly point out that Russians are rational, and that
the design of policies should keep this in mind. However, this was only
one dimension of the shadow economy. As Humphrey (2002) pointed
out, shadow economies, like "corruption" and privatization, are practices with multiple dimensions of meaning. The shadow economy was
not simply an instrumentally opportunistic response to tax laws and
state corruption; it was also a game of power and meaning, for example
in which "bribes" were also "fees" entrepreneurs were prepared to pay
to navigate the overly complex system of rules and red tape-in the process contributing to the reproduction of "corruption." That corruption
has become worse under Putin is partly a result of the Kremlin elite's
own practices of taking private property selectively (i.e. taking Boris
Berezovskii's and Mikhail Khodorkovskii's empires while others such as
Roman Abramovich flouted wealth they gained in histories that remain
secret): such practices from above legitimated local authorities, use of
state authority for personal gain.
One problem is that much scholarship on economies and economic
change overlooks that which post-socialism clearly revealed, especially in Russia: "economies"-Soviet and reform socialism, American
and French capitalism-are manifestations of power-culture and practice reified via narratives into socially ontological, autonomous
essences. Analyses of "economies," especially by economists, assume
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particular categories as objective, ontologically real, and universal (e.g.
"prices" and "costs"), order those categories into normal/abnormal
or sacred/profane, and then organize those binary sets into narratives of seemingly evolutionary, natural social normality. Yet we need
to question what "economies" to make sense of "economic change,"
"post-socialism," and so on. Post-socialist change is akin to processes
Timothy Mitchell (2002) noted for Egypt, William Roy for America,
and William Reddy and Karl Polanyi for French and British capitalism. A "market economy" is a set of meanings and narratives (Foucault
1970; Mccloskey 2003). As Mitchell notes, "economy" once meant
many connected practices; later, autonomous practices with their own
laws that, in some discourses, are the core of human nature. PostWorld War II translations of Simmel added the definite article "the"
to "economy," so that Simmel wrote of "the economy" rather than
"economy"; or inserted "system" into Weber's definition of "economy"
(Mitchell 2002: 80-81, 323n9). Today, bankers, accountants, journalists, and state officials make up a "community of discourse" (Wuthnow
1989) using market language, even if many do not know the math or
speak different dialects. This discourse is not only categories; it is a
meta-narrative of normality that reifies "economy" as a distinct social
sphere. 9
Culture and narratives are never far from power. Categories and language games are buttressed by the economics profession and institutions
(the IMF, WTO, central bankers, multinational CEOs) with material and
symbolic resources to force acceptance of this narrative and assumptions of "economy" that these keepers of truth understand (Centeno and
Silva 1998). This power dynamic is hidden by hegemonic discourse of
mainstream economics. Analyses end up caught in the meta-narrative,
losing reflexivity and trapping analysts and readers inside categories
that should be subject to study lest power-culture become invisible.
In one pristine example, economist Andrei Shleifer, a student of Russia
who advised its leaders, and co-author Donald Treisman (Shleifer and
Treisman 2005; see also Shleifer 2005) dubbed Russia "normal," as its
current problems (e.g. corruption) are "normal" for a country in Russia's
position on the road to market utopia. Yet Shleifer is really providing less
analysis than more grist for the reigning meta-narrative, where rational
actors, markets, and material incentives play leading roles, and linear
historical "progress" is assumed. 10 Shock therapy, while imperfect, set
Russia on the straight and narrow; oil wealth sped it further. Rather than
study post-socialism as change on its own terms, Shleifer and Treisman
shove it into a grand narrative that reifies "markets" and "economies"
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and blinds us to questions of power and meaning-the heart and soul of
economies, polities, societies, and change, as scholars in the nineteenth
century saw with more sober clarity. 11
As a rule, in too much First and Second Wave work power and authority tend to be instrumental outcomes of laws, institutions, and elite
games-which raises the tautology of assuming institutions to be operative in the first place. Culture has been ignored theoretically, although
in informal discussions economists, political scientists, historians, and
sociologists (Russian and non-Russian) readily admit the issue of Russian
culture's impact on post-socialism. "These people just don't get it"-the
cry of exasperation I heard so often from American and some Russian
academics over twenty years of studying Russia-means culture lurks
in informal analyses (and also in the worldviews of those making such
comments, for what were Russians supposed to "get" anyway!). But
this raises the question of just what "culture" is. Certainly, I am not
accusing political scientists of ignoring ideology and "values" per se:
public opinion polls, elite and party ideologies, and the like are grist
for political science research. However, there is an interesting theoretical disconnect, especially in Public Choice theory and positive political
economy (and increasingly in institutionalist political science): How do
"ideology" and material interests or utility interact? Is ideology merely
part of preferences or a framing of preferences? 12 To reduce ideology or
ethics to a preference is to push the issue off to the side and define it
away-but this does not remove the impact of culture as a social process and product. Culture is dynamic and historically contextualized
and does not allow easy quantification and statistical modeling. I do
not propose a model for quantification (but see Franzosi 2004); I do
propose a structured approach to culture in post-socialism. Following
Wuthnow (1987), Kennedy (2002), and Smith (2005), I view culture as
the symbolic-expressive dimension of human action, which involves
meaning through articulation (discourse), use of symbols, and material practices related to a particular context (i.e. not just any generic
material practice). One approach is culture as tacit knowledge and logics
underlying practices (cf. Hass 2005).
A complementary approach is to examine categories of meaning
through which people order the world and the logics and narratives
they construct to link those categories to create a blueprint for social
order and structure.13 First, categories. Durkheim (1965 [1915]), Douglas
(1966), Bourdieu (1990), Foucault (1977), and others demonstrated how
people make sense of the vast physical and social environment by creating categories and placing objects or other entities into them ("boy,"
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"girl," "community," etc.). Many categories (not all) are ordered into
dichotomies of sacred and profane or normal and abnormal. This provides a second degree of order, along a continuum of positive-negative.
(Status hierarchies are a variant of this, with low status equivalent to
profane.) If categories order the social world in physical, social, or virtual space, logics and narratives order the social world in time (Hass
2011: chapter 1). A "logic" is a linking of categories and practices presumed to have affinity. Logics structure categories and practices into
processes; these are linked to contexts, although they might be transposable. A "narrative" is an ordering of categories and practices with
teleological foundation (ultimate outcome): particular sequences of particular categories and practices lead to something. A logic of capitalism
would be connected practices in a context; a narrative of capitalism
would involve teleology of capitalist practices leading to something, for
example exploitation and enrichment. 14
One important aspect of this approach is that narratives are not relegated to far;:ades or mere accounts of material, institutional processes:
narratives act as independent variables as well as outcomes. Narratives result from actors combining and creating categories and their
arrangements; they reduce uncertainty and create a template that at
least proposes the possibility of agency. In a powerful insight, Nietzsche
(2000: 46) wrote, "In this sense the Dionysian man is similar to Hamlet: both have at one time cast a true glance into the essence of things,
they have acquired knowledge, and action is repugnant to them; for their
action can change nothing in the eternal essence of things, they feel that
it is laughable or shameful that they are expected to repair a world which
is out of joint. Knowledge kills action, to action belongs the veil of
illusion ... " True knowledge of the complex reality of economies, or of
anything social, would paralyze actors: narratives and cultural schemas
let people believe that they can attempt action or even succeed. 15 Such
narratives and cultural frameworks not only provide illusions necessary
for action; they can then act back on actors as templates for legitimacy and knowledge. The illusion becomes taken for granted as the
true nature of reality. Regimes, elites, or other actors who champion
and impose narratives risk losing legitimacy if they suddenly turn from
them, unless they successfully pull off a "road to Damascus" moment of
contrition-and even this is a risk to competency, as admitting mistakes
often can be, and to trust, as others might suspect dishonesty. Narratives can also be templates of knowledge, acting as the equivalent of
ritualized, simplified theory or common sense. As Dobbin (1994) noted,
different countries have different narratives about policies that guard

Introduction: Rethinking the Political Economy of Post-Socialism 17

sacred sovereignty and produce economic growth, and standing against
such narratives can encourage resistance. 16 Let me provide a brief illustration to make my point concrete and to draw attention to cultural
contradictions of the post-Soviet experience. Russian business discourse
paired central categories of economic activity into profane Soviet versus sacred post-Soviet (market) groupings. Three such categories I list in
Table I.1 below.
Table I.l

Soviet and post-Soviet business meanings

Soviet-era term
(profane)

Post-Soviet term (sacred)

(General meaning)

Upravlenie/direktor
Predpriiatie
Obedinenie

"Afenedzhment/menedzher
Firma
Kholding/korporatsiia

(Economic leadership/leader)
(Business organization)
(Enterprise conglomerate)

The reader can guess the etymology of the second column, business
terms used since 1991. More than buzz words, these were central to new
constructions of normal practice and the intended trajectory of change.
Upravlenie meant bureaucratic administration of enterprises; the goal
was to fulfill state orders to use labor and resources to make commodities, provide jobs, and so on. The goal was political-social. In contrast,
menedzhment is a scientific approach for using labor and resources to
make profit, oriented to the market rather than bureaucratic rules. These
two words are not interchangeable, even if both are ostensibly a small
group commanding a larger group. Power disappears in the new normality: direktor uses authority, but menedzher negotiates by rationally
aligning incentives.17 Further, predpriiatie (enterprise) and obedinenie
(production association), Soviet-era categories of bureaucratic organization, gave way to the profit-oriented firma, kholding, and korporatsiia
(firm, holding company, corporation). These shifts in meanings were
significant, hand-in-hand with contentious enterprise privatization and
organizational restructuring. The Soviet obedinenie, concerned with fulfilling Plan targets and providing welfare to workers while inculcating
collective Soviet identities and practices, was to become a kholding oriented to efficient use of resources to make profit for shareholders-a shift
in loci of organizational power, normality, and everyday practices. 18
Those categories were also linked in narratives. A central aspect of
late Soviet and post-Soviet politics involved defending versus changing
the "sacred" or "profane" location for these categories: for reformers,
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Soviet-era upravlenie was profane, related to unnatural Soviet socialism.
Once categories were ordered into sacred or profane, narrative construction could occur. Reformers could devise a narrative of menedzhment
applying (Western) rational processes of using labor and capital to raise
efficiency and profit. This involved creating private property to raise
investment and to make menedzhery accountable.
Post-socialism was new meanings, discourses, authority, and practices that were not crystal clear; they were confused, contentious, and
retained elements from the past. Meanings do not jump into people's
minds fully formed; Russians undertook a journey to make sense of
them in practice. This requires that Russians, and those of us who study
their economic practices and history, pay closer and more nuanced
attention to culture: we should pay heed to Viviana Zelizer's (1988) call
to study "multiple markets." Zelizer's main concern was the American
economy: that within one economic system exchange took on multiple
forms, based on different norms, relations, and cultural understandings linked to the different contexts (e.g. from market exchange to
exchange of gifts). But her idea can be extended to the study of transitions· as well: that within and between emerging markets there will
be multiple forms of exchange and production. What this means is
that Anders Aslund may be right-Russia may have a market economy, only it will not have much resemblance to Britain's or Poland's
because of differences in institutional, cultural, and structural trajectories and processes. While the usual response is to invoke "institutions,"
this is as much smoke and mirrors as a real answer: what are "institutions," anyway, but cultural categories about everyday practice enacted
collectively, with formal mechanisms of enforcement? This opens the
door to making more sense of the chaos and conflict of Russian postsocialism: culture is not universal, shared, straightforward morals or
values, but contested, not always coherent systems of meaning. Further, as scholars such as Anthony Giddens (1984) and others realized
(e.g. Nelson and Winter 1982), consciousness and knowledge of practice work at two levels, tacit and conscious. I may change my title
from direktor (upravlenie logic) to menedzher (menedzhment logic) and
have no idea how the latter works in practice: labels are an illusion of change. As well, creating menedzher and korporatsiia involves
remaking status hierarchies-an invitation to conflict and confusion
(why should a menedzher be legitimate?). Small wonder Russia was
a mess until oil wealth provided a fig leaf. Given their attention to
power and culture, economic sociologists should have seen this coming.
We did not.
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Culture and economy at work: Moral and market economies
Categories, structured in sacred-profane dichotomies and ordered in
narratives, are further ordered as moral and market economies. The
hierarchy of meanings is as follows:

categories (sacred-profane)
of "economies"

--+

logics/narratives of categories

--+

narratives

While I discuss moral and market economies in more detail in the next
chapter, let us set the stage here. A moral economy (cf. Scott 1976) is
not just norms and practices of redistribution and reciprocity for survival; it is categories (community, collective property, etc.) embedded in
narratives (redistribution as necessary for survival, threats of individuals
acting on their own, etc.). I use "market economy" in an unorthodox
way: not as social space or institutions of exchange, but as a set of narratives of how normal exchange is supposed to operate. The narrative
of markets is a narrative of individual autonomy, prosperity (individual
and collective), efficiency and competition, and evolutionary progress.
This all need not be empirically true; narratives are interpretations, and
like myths they may contain elements of truth, but they are as much
stories as embodiments of truth. My use of market economy as narrative
is also not so far from the usual institutional understanding of market
economy: after all, institutions involve logics and narratives themselves
that justify those institutions and make them understandable.
Alas, that narratives have little room in post-socialist analyses reflects
limitations in existing scholarship on post-socialism. Microeconomics
and political economy produced insights about barter and trajectories
of change (e.g. Gaddy and Ickes 2002). However, these theories are limited by areas of inquiry-for example economic exchange alone, rather
than exchange and interaction more generally-and by compartmentalization within and across disciplines. Economic theory remains locked
in assumptions of behavior (rational choice), obsolete cognitive models, and obsession with efficiency explanations (Roy 1997; Herrera 2004:
chapter 2), such that other social forces such as power and culture are
ignored, not simply undertheorized; this leads to problematic policy recommendations or analyses that are plain wrong (Millar 1995). Much of
this is inexcusable when a well-developed, sophisticated literature on
culture (often including criticisms of economic theory that economists
have avoided) has existed for decades. 19 Political science and economic
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sociology have fared better, but there remains room for improvement.
General variables are elite politics, state structure and capacity (or, more
likely, state incapacity), regional social capital or networks, and formal
law and policies (Stoner-Weiss 1997; Stark and Bruszt 1998; Hendley,
Murrell, and Ryterman 1999; Eyal et al 2001). Social relations are not
unimportant, but to conceptualize them as structure alone, rather than
addressing their meanings-and changes in meanings-is an enormous
oversight (cf. Humphrey 2002).
While existing scholarship provides a cornucopia of data and concepts, richness remains circumscribed because interesting theoretical
approaches that could deliver powerful insights are pigeonholed into
specific areas of study due to academic compartmentalization. For
example, Pierre Bourdieu's work on class inequality and reproduction
provides an interesting foundation for new thinking about the nature
of post-Soviet institution-building, especially the importance of fields
of struggle and power and their rules of engagement. While Stark and
Bruszt (1998) discuss post-socialist fields, their use of the concept makes
it feel tacked on rather than elucidated and applied innovatively. We are
in a position to take Bourdieu's ideas of field and doxa, habitus, and capital and expand them in a context of radical change. Work on professions
accentuating the complex nature of authority (Starr 1982) can provide
insights into relations between different social groups, such as manages
and employees or managers and owners, in the post-privatization era.
Advancements in the understanding of power (Lukes 1974; Foucault
1977; Scott 1990) have not been so well utilized in social science, and
for post-Soviet transformations they may provide powerful insights into
why we see existing trajectories and variations.
Thus, one goal of this book is to challenge and expand our understandings of post-Soviet transformations by tapping theories so far
underutilized (if used at all) in analyses. I will draw on various sources
of data-original primary-source data as well secondary data from various disciplines and accounts-to map out a theoretical landscape. One
important goal is to rethink how to look at these data. Thus far postSoviet institutional change has been a story of legislation by parliaments
and presidents or struggles between elites for control of polity and economy. Following seminal insights from Pierre Bourdieu, I want to look
deeper into social dynamics of institutional change. Institutions as sets
of collective rules and practices-often assumed to be formalized rules
and procedures but possibly informal, reenacted through everyday practices and informal sanctions (cf. North 1990)-are embedded in fields
of social interaction structured by statuses, classificatory schemas, and
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assumes rules of the game (doxa). Thus, I suggest that rebuilding postSoviet economies (and polities and societies) involved not only policies
and laws but also remaking broader assumptions and classifications of
the "post-Soviet" game-what the game is. State actors played key roles,
but they were far from alone and could not escape fields. States engage
fields through material resources (i.e. financing some actors over others) and coercion (enforcing laws). This dimension to state power is
well known. Yet this is only part of the picture. Following Bourdieu
(1996), I suggest that states also accumulate and wield (or lose) symbolic
resources, especially status of legitimate authority and the capacity to confer
social legitimacy. This dimension of the state is usually lost in accounts
of post-Soviet change (but see Humphrey 2002). When states grant or
enforce rights, they are not simply throwing the weight of material
resources force behind social claimants; they are signaling social legitimacy, including the status of social actors to make legitimate claims
and rely on the state to enforce them-as if the state is conferring some
of its social status and authority to these private actors.
To draw out these themes, in Chapter 1 I work out the symbolic
dimension of economic fields and moral and market economies as
structured normative frames in fields. The sources of authority and
sovereignty become issues of contention, and I will suggest that postSoviet Russia has gone through three phases or "acts" (in the theatrical
sense) of authority, and that this helps us make sense of the various
forms of struggle and conflict that emerged. Chapter 2 examines cultural
foundations of enterprises and enterprise restructuring, in particular
how moral and market economies coexisted and then contradicted one
another, as managers and workers negotiated remaking the structure
and meaning of the late Soviet and early post-Soviet firm. Chapter 3
examines how actors restructured the foundations of exchange, especially structuring and defending obligations such as contract. Given the
weakness of the state and problematic laws related to exchange, moral
economy provided a normative dimension of defense that Durkheim
once called the non-contractual dimension of contract. Chapter 4 turns
to the manifestation of value. The ruble was not the only means for
storing value and facilitating exchange; the multiplicity of "currencies"
was a response to uncertainty and state incapacity to enforce the ruble
as uniform currency in local fields. Private actors devised alternative
"currencies" to avoid state regulation and taxation in games of resistance and survival. Chapter 5 examines the moral economy of the
state, property, and fields of power: how state elites and officials were
embedded in moral economy norms, and change and continuity in
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those norms; and how state actors contributed to the development of
market and moral economies through legislation and participation in
discourse.
This book is not a study of one firm or set of firms/sectors to control
specific variables. My goal is to elucidate particular cultural processes too
often elided. For such model building, a more general empirical investigation is justifiable.20 While focused studies facilitate rigorous data
collection and analysis, especially the capacity to control for different
variables under scrutiny, they are also limited in making sense of the
post-socialist experience because they are so focused on narrow issues
and data sources. My goal is to take a broader look, and this requires a
broader set of empirical issues and cases, and a wider net for capturing
data. I use both primary and secondary data sources here. To the extent
there is a case, it is the political economy of Russia; specific cases most
often come from St. Petersburg, because I did extensive research in that
city owing to networks allowing data access, familiarity with the city, its
size and variation in types of economic activity. When possible, I will
draw on work done by others so as not to reinvent the wheel. In other
cases I will draw on data I collected: interviews and fieldwork from the
1990s, enterprise newspapers from the late Soviet and early post-Soviet
periods. The analysis is qualitative and interpretive, in the tradition of
historical and cultural sociology and much political and economic sociology. In the process of rethinking the post-Soviet experience, I engage
some previous scholarship, but I will be judicious in doing so. Literature reviews have their place, but the massive amount of scholarship
on post-socialism would risk a literature review devouring this work,
and engaging too much risks distracting attention from the argument
at hand. Further, not all work on post-socialism is sufficiently useful or
relevant. I also admit a bias: my experience at job talks, conferences, and
other presentations convinced me that many engagements of scholarly
literature are exercises in posturing or creating "enemies" to signal one's
position or to add a halo of legitimacy to one's work. I invite the reader
to be the ultimate arbiter. 21

